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The concept of adaptation is becoming part of mainstream public discourse on climate 
change. Yet the diversity, complexity and novelty of the adaptation concept itself leads to 
interpretive flexibility, differing public understanding of (and engagement with) adaptation 
strategies, and hence differentiated policy responses. The boundary work of communicative 
practices and public understanding of the adaptation concept therefore require empirical 
analysis in different cases and contexts. This study employs Q-methodology, a combined 
quantitative-qualitative social research method, to reveal the typologies of perspectives that 
emerge around the adaptation concept amongst a diverse group of citizen-stakeholders in the 
United Kingdom. Four such typologies are identified under the labels: 1) Top-down climate 
action, 2) Collective action on climate change, 3) Optimistic, values-focused adaptation, and 
4) Adaptation skepticism. The division between these perspectives reveals a perceived 
Òresponsibility gapÓ between the governmental-institutional and/or individual-community 
levels. Across the emergent discourses we find a consensual call for a multi-sector, multi-
scalar and multi-stakeholder-led approach that posits adaptation as a contemporary, intra-
generational problem, with a strong emphasis upon managing extreme weather events; and 
not an abstract future problem. By attending to these public discourses in climate policy, this 
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Introduction - adapting to climate change 
Adaptation is a process by which human actors as individuals, communities, regions, national 
or trans-national entities act in order to cope with the consequences of climate change. Even 
with rapid greenhouse gas emission stabilisation/reduction globally, the long reaction times 
within climate systems mean that global temperatures will still increase, requiring remedial 
actions to ameliorate emergent negative environmental and socio-economic impacts. This 
necessitates combined technical and societal responses to reduce systemic vulnerability to 
climate variability effects.  
 
Despite potential benefits such as longer growing seasons in cooler countries (e.g. 
Linderholm 2006) or more efficient shipping routes through an ice-free Arctic (Smith and 
Stephenson 2013), the negative impacts of climate change are significant and far reaching. 
These include (but are not limited to) increased incidence/intensity of extreme weather events 
(Stott et al. 2016), biodiversity redistribution and loss (Pacifici et al. 2015; Pecl et al. 2017), 
extinction risks (Urban 2015), disruption to ecosystem services (Geneletti and Zardo 2016; 
Lavorel et al. 2015), heat stress (Deryng et al. 2014; Lindberg et al. 2016; Voskamp and Van 
de Ven 2015), drought (Trenberth et al. 2014), sea-level rise and coastal flooding (Carson et 
al. 2016; Clark et al. 2016), fluvial and pluvial flooding (Arnell and Gosling 2016; Kaspersen 
et al. 2017; Kundzewicz et al. 2014), ocean acidification (Boyd et al. 2015; Riebesell and 
Gattuso 2014) and growing resource restrictions such as loss of potable water supply (Dll et 
al. 2015; Khan et al. 2015), crop failure (Challinor et al. 2014), associated negative socio-
economic effects from supply disruption within infrastructure networks (Chappin and van der 
Lei 2014) and negative impacts upon public health (Watts et al. 2015). 
 
Climate change affects multiple aspects of human economic and social activity, but the 
impacts are (or will be) highly differentiated by sector (agriculture, infrastructure, marine 
management, flood defense etc.) and will affect different 
countries/regions/communities/individuals in multiple ways based upon their vulnerability 
and relative adaptive capacity. It is important for decision-makers to question the extent to 
which adaptation reduces the risks of climate change, what policies are needed, and how can 
they best be developed and applied (Burton et al. 2002). This requires knowledge of how 
adaptation choices are made under conditions of resource constraint and uncertainty, and how 
existing policies can be amended or Ôclimate proofedÕ (Urwin and Jordan 2008); whilst 
avoiding the risks of maladaptation - whereby actions that or initiatives that foster short-term 
gains but insidiously affect systemsÕ long-term vulnerability and/or adaptive capacity to 
climate change over the longer term (Barnett and OÕNeill 2010). This picture is further 
complicated by the fact that adaptation pathways are mediated by the relative socio-political, 
cultural and economic status of different actors involved (Brooks et al. 2005). They are 
context-specific - there is no single adaptation response that can cover all outcomes in all 
cases. It is therefore necessary for adaptation strategies to be sensitive to the underlying 
political and cultural roots of such actions (Pelling 2010). Adger (2003) argues, therefore, 
that adaptation is best understood as a dynamic social process: one that is commonly 
understood to require a localized, bottom-up, place-based and co-produced approach in order 
to be successful (Lo and Jim 2015; Meadow et al. 2015; Rayner 2010; Van Aalst et al. 2008).  
 
Adaptation as a matter of public perception and environmental communication 
The influence of public perceptions in shaping policy preferences and individual adaptation 
outcomes is an important aspect of climate change politics. However, the question of how to 
take into account heterogeneous public and stakeholder values, perceptions and concerns in a 
local, bottom-up and co-produced manner remains fraught with communicative barriers. 
Whether at the level of policy-making or individual action, the question of how to adapt is 
subject to framing effects, in which choices are influenced by the way in which the problem 
is conceptualised and presented to decision-makers (Chong and Druckman 2007; Frisch 
1993; Lakoff 2010; McEvoy et al. 2010; Nisbet 2009; O'Brien et al. 2007). Perceptions of 
everything from changes to local weather patterns to the validity of long-term climate 
forecasts are subject to cultural biases and political ideology (Goebbert et al. 2012; Hulme 
2009; McNeeley and Lazrus 2014). In practice, adaptation research and policy is, as Adger et 
al. (2013) note, primarily focused upon the material aspects (such as technological solutions, 
or quantifiable impacts to ecosystems or livelihoods), yet the so-called ÔsofterÕ social and 
cultural aspects have been less thoroughly researched and integrated into policy.  
 
One specific social dimension of adaptation concerns environmental communication and 
broader public engagement with the concept itself. Adaptation has received relatively little 
coverage in print and televised media, as discourses surrounding the mitigation of high 
impact/low probability climate impacts have remained dominant (Anderson 2009; Boykoff 
2007). Although within climate change policy and planning something of adaptation-
mitigation dichotomy has emerged (Biesbroek et al. 2015; Moser 2012), the two concepts are 
principally scientific constructs and so non-expert citizens may not perceive them as mutually 
exclusive. For example both terms can be conflated or confused (Moser 2014) or else 
mutually framed within public discourse within a wider sustainability umbrella (Chilvers et 
al., 2014). There is therefore, as Moser (2014) argues, a need to communicate specific 
adaptation risks and realities to multiple stakeholder audiences in a more effective way. 
 
 Though there is a pressing need for better adaptation communication, climate 
communicators encounter numerous barriers to effective engagement (Lorenzoni et al. 2007; 
Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Such barriers include (a relative lack of) stakeholder awareness, 
problems of scientific uncertainty around the estimates of future greenhouse gas emissions 
and in projections of future climate impacts, the relative psychological/spatial/temporal 
distance through which many in developed countries perceive climate change (Spence et al. 
2012); alongside communication resource constraints and a lack of underlying political 
commitment (Clar et al. 2013; Eisenack et al. 2014). Commonly cited solutions include 
awareness raising activities, and closing knowledge gaps through decision-support 
frameworks (Clar et al. 2013). Yet as Storbjrk (2007) notes, there is persistent confusion 
over what the term adaptation encompasses and what it hopes to achieve; and though low 
public awareness about adaptation is associated with a lack of action, simply disseminating 
knowledge about climate change impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity is unlikely to 
remove existing barriers to adaptation and lead to positive action (Archie et al. 2012; Moser 
and Ekstrom 2010). The conceptual complexity of adaptation produces heterogeneous mental 
models of its nature and impacts amongst diverse stakeholder groups (Otto-Banaszak et al. 
2011); and because adaptation incorporates a huge array of actions carried out across a wide 
variety of settings by a number of different actors under different institutional and scalar 
governance constraints, multi-stakeholder engagement with citizens, public bodies and 
interest groups, businesses and government organizations involves a wide differentiation of 
responsibilities within each of these interested parties (Adger et al. 2005).  
 
We can conclude from this problem of adaptation communication that ÒsuccessÓ is subject to 
a negotiation amongst competing stakeholder interests, which each have differing 
conceptions of the core concept. This means that adaptation is essentially a type of boundary 
work (Gieryn 1999), in the sense that the conceptual plasticity of adaptation involves socially 
constructed demarcation of adaptation concepts and practices and the negotiation of these at 
multiple geographic and governance scales. It is necessary, therefore, to present climate 
change adaptation in a way that is meaningful to non-experts and avoid engagement within a 
narrow bounded rationality that focuses solely upon scientific issues (particularly as framing 
climate change in adaptation-terms may be more engaging for individuals who show low 
concern for climate change overall, see: Howell et al. 2016). In order to mobilise knowledge 
about adaptation in a way that is credible, salient and politically legitimate, what is required 
is a more citizen-centered examination of adaptation perceptions and issues (Leith 2011) to 
better explore multiple definitions and meanings. It is this boundary work, exploring the 
conceptual plasticity of adaptation and how it is discursively demarcated, that is under 
consideration in this empirical study. We suggest that given the relative novelty of the 
climate adaptation concept in broader public debate amongst citizen-stakeholders (and hence 
the potential for publicsÕ differentiated and complex interpretations of it), and given the lack 
of media coverage and policy debate on the topic, further qualitative exploration of subjective 
representations of the concept is necessary in order to better understand typologies of 
heterogeneous citizen-stakeholder perspectives on the issue (and hence inform adaptation 
communication practices). In this empirical social scientific study of adaptation amongst 
citizen-stakeholders in the United Kingdom, we apply a mixed-method qualitative-
quantitative approach termed ÒQ-methodologyÓ to explore this conceptual diversity and we 
report upon the relevance of these findings for climate adaptation communicative practice. Q-
method has shown considerable value in exploring subjective perspectives on a range of 
environmental management issues ranging from energy (Cotton and Devine-Wright 2011; 
Cuppen et al. 2010; Venables et al. 2009), forestry (Steelman and Maguire 1999), to 
agriculture and conservation (Bumbudsanpharoke et al. 2009). The method has also been 
applied in climate change (principally mitigation) perceptions and engagement research in 
recent years (Burke et al. 2018; Lo 2016; O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009; OÕNeill et al. 
2013), and this study aims to complement these findings through a specific emphasis on 
adaptation discourse within this broader field. 
 
Understanding public perspectives on climate adaptation Ð a role for Q-methodology 
 
Q-methodology (hereafter referred to as Q-method), is a specialist social research method, 
designed by Stephenson (1953) as a means to analyze subjective opinion (Cross 2005). Q-
method quantitatively maps subjective attitudes and opinions, rendering them open to 
statistical analysis. It enables researchers to identify a number of discourses (sometimes 
referred to as idealized accounts) around a topic. Unlike social survey methods which impose 
specific categories against which attitudes are measured, Q-method examines subjectivity 
from the standpoint of the person experiencing it (Brown 1996). It is in this way that we use 
the method for the study of the boundary work of the climate adaptation concept - it 
combines quantitative and qualitative techniques in order to reveal the relevant types of 
perspective in a population, rather than the prevalence of such types. It is therefore valuable 
in explaining how and why people think they way that they do about climate adaptation, 
rather than counting how many people think one way or another (see for example Tielen et al. 
2008). 
Though statistical in nature, Q-method is consistent with post-positivist social scientific 
analysis (Durning 1999); particularly in relation to the analysis of discourse (see Dryzek 1990 
for examination of this point). As Cotton (2015) suggests, Q-method has value in its capacity 
to mediate between the micro-discursive realm of individual statements of belief and social 
practices, and the macro-discursive realm of broader social and environmental discourses. 
Using Q-method allows us to link individual stakeholder perspectives to broader debate 
within civil society on the management of climate adaptation. Thus Q-method is chosen, as 
Dasgupta and Vira (2005) suggest, because it is highly suited to researching adaptation as a 
social phenomenon around which there is conceptual novelty, debate, conflict and 
contestation. 
 
Q-Methodology in practice 
 
In this Q-method study we follow a five-stage research plan.  
1.! Defining a concourse 
2.! Selecting the statements for Q-sorting 
3.! Selecting a participant sample (P-sample) 
4.! Q-sorting the statements 
5.! Analysing and interpreting the results. 
 
1.! Defining a concourse 
A concourse refers to Òthe flow of communicability surrounding any topicÓ (Brown 1993) Ð 
the concourse encapsulates the range of positions taken on the climate change adaptation 
concept. It is ultimately from this concourse of ideas that Q-method collates and correlates 
individual responses and extracts idealized forms of discourse latent in the data provided by 
the individuals in the study (Brown 1996; McKeown and Thomas 1988). The concourse is a 
collected set of statements from which we draw a representative sample (Watts and Stenner 
2012). This collected set was gleaned by using Boolean search operators within well-known 
databases (Google, Google Scholar, Scopus, Web of Knowledge and Nexis). In sequence: 
Òclimate change adaptationÓ, then searches with Òclimate change adaptationÓ AND operator 
for Òstrategy OR strategiesÓ, ÒmediaÓ, ÒsocialÓ, Òperception OR perceptionsÓ, Òpolicy OR 
policiesÓ, Òresponsibility OR responsibilitiesÓ, Òindividual OR individualsÓ. These searches 
produced a series of secondary sources to form a ready-made Q-sample, drawing statements 
(primarily) from academic, NGO, policy document, weblog, and activist written sources (we 
collected 210 statements in total for the complete concourse).  
An inductive content analysis of the findings was used to code the retrieved documents and 
generate statement categories through which to sample statements used in the Q-sort process. 
The content analysis allowed us to alternate between specific categories and emergent 
relationships within the corpus of materials and also to quantify and categorize the text 
responses that form the raw material for the processes of selecting statements for subsequent 
Q-sorting. 
 
2.! Selecting the statements for Q-sorting 
As Brown (1993) suggests, the selection process for those statements to be included remains 
Òmore art than scienceÓ. The statements collected were selected to encapsulate the various 
standpoints and cover as many sub-issues within the topic as possible so that the participants 
can truly express their views. It must be noted, however, that is only when the participants are 
sorting the statements that the statements have meaning (Watts and Stenner 2012). However, 
it behooves Q-researchers to provide structure to the selection to ensure that obvious biases 
within the corpus of materials can be eliminated or ameliorated. This is done by forcing the 
researcher to select a wide variety of statements in order to make the Q-set broadly 
representative. 
 
In practice, we selected a subset of statements from the concourse for presentation to the 
participants (called the Q-sample, or sometimes Q-set). Structuring the Q-sample introduces 
some overt bias in statement selection, and as it is ultimately the researcher that makes the 
selection of statements deemed relevant then different researchers would make different 
selections from the same concourse (van Exel and de Graaf 2005). Wording may also differ, 
so we piloted the statement set with student participants (not included in the final dataset) 
specifically on wording. It must be noted that ambiguity of the statements is not in itself a 
problem. This is because participants give their own meaning to the statements based on 
where they are sorted and they will interpret statements in their own way (Coogan and 
Herrington 2011). We expect, therefore, as Thomas and Baas (1992) argue, that different 
statements, constructed in different ways from the same concourse will still produce similar 
conclusions. This is because the Q-method operation is subjective and represents an 
individualÕs point of view; there is no external criterion for evaluating an individualÕs 
response to a particular statement, thus, each individualÕs set of rank-ordered statements is 
deemed a valid expression of his or her opinion (Brown 1993). 
 
To select statements, we followed a procedure similar to that of McLaughlin and Cutts ((in 
press)). First, we developed the concourse of statements. Second, we thematically coded the 
statements into five overarching themes, based on a reasonable assessment and interpretation 
of each statement. Third, duplicate and confusing statements were eliminated from the initial 
concourse. Fourth, another statement elimination process was conducted from feedback 
collected from a mock pilot study with students. Fifth, statements were randomly eliminated 
from each theme to maintain equal statement counts within each theme for a Q-set total of 34 
statements. Sixth, the selected Q-set was independently checked by an academic not involved 
in this study. Finally, the set was discussed between authors to ensure that they were 
Òunambiguous, non-contentious, and comprehensiveÓ (Spurgeon et al. 2012) to ensure 
balance, breadth, and applicability to the issue of climate change adaptation. The statements 
were then numbered and printed on cards in preparation of the Q-sort. The thematic analysis 
categories and some example statements are listed below: 
 
Theme: Potential impacts and outcomes 
¥! Statement 13: The implementation of climate change adaptation strategies will alter 
my lifestyle significantly. 
¥! Statement 25: Adapting to climate change will be detrimental to economic growth and 
opportunity. 
 
Theme: Technologies and strategies 
¥! Statement 8: Adaptation to climate change should be focused on traditional, hard 
techniques such as structural adjustments e.g. sea walls to combat rising sea levels. 
¥! Statement 9: Adaptation strategies and mitigation strategies must complement one 
another. 
 
Theme: Responsibilities (political and moral) 
¥! Statement 5: Climate change adaptation strategies will disproportionately affect the 
worldÕs poorest people. 
¥! Statement 34: Climate change adaptation must be a collaborative effort and must 
involve a range of stakeholders (e.g. general public, business sector, local 
government, national government). 
 
Theme: Knowledge, perception and awareness 
¥! Statement 7: I am concerned about the melting of the polar icecapsÓ 
¥! Statement 19: Climate change has dropped off the agenda.Ó 
 
Theme: Limitations and barriers 
¥! Statement 6: When barriers, such as technological requirements and financial 




3.! Selecting a participant sample (P-sample) 
In our study, as in other Q-method case studies, a comparatively small number of participants 
is desirable (when compared to R-method surveys). Brown (1980) argues that Òall that is 
required are enough subjects to establish the existence of a factor for purposes of comparing 
one factor to anotherÓ. The underlying premise of the method is that within a community, 
there are fewer ways of thinking of a given topic than there are people (Neff 2014). 
Consequently, the number of participants in the P-set makes is typically smaller than the 
number of statements in the Q-sample. As in a range of similar environmental social science 
studies using Q-methodology (Cuppen et al. 2010; Steelman and Maguire 1999; Wolsink 
2010) our participant sampling (P-sample) was intended to represent diversity of knowledge, 
experiences (and hence differing perspectives) amongst citizen-stakeholders: in essence those 
that are likely to have a distinct viewpoint on the problem in hand, which will in turn, give 
meaning to their responses (Robbins and Kreuger 2001). However, as Watts and Stenner 
(2005) suggest, it is better under such circumstances to avoid a priori assumptions based upon 
preconceived demographic categorization. Q-method allows individuals to self-categorize on 
the basis of the item configurations they produce, so opportunistic or purposive sampling 
techniques are recommended over random sampling in the manner of an R-survey (Brouwer 
1999). 
During the period May-July 2015, 30 returned Q-sorts from a geographically and 
professionally diverse group of citizen-stakeholders constitute the primary data for this study. 
The age range for the purposively sampled P-set was 18-68 (Male: 17, Female 13). Some Q-
sorts were conducted face-to-face and others by post (though this is not expected to yield a 
difference in result, see Tubergen and Olins 1979). A variety of professional backgrounds 
including both ÔlayÕ (non-specialist) perspectives, as well as those with specific stakeholder 
interests related to climate change adaptation outcomes - including environmental, local 
government, urban and transport planning, public health and agriculture 




The participants ÒQ-sortedÓ the statements according to the condition of instruction (van Exel 
and de Graaf 2005) i.e. to sort the cards from most like my opinion (+4) to least like my 
opinion (-4). 0 is neutral. As is common in Q-method studies, respondents were instructed to 
adhere to a pre-determined (in this case forced quasi-normal) distribution as shown in Figure 
1. It is customary to conduct short post-sort questionnaire to allowing participants to reflect 
and further define their position on the statements within the Q-sort. We altered this protocol 
by instructing participants to instead annotate the back of each of the statement cards, and to 
write down their reflections upon each Q-sort statement on the other side Ð allowing personal 
sorter reflections to be easily traceable back to each of the Q-set items. Examples of these 
short statements are included as qualitative data in the discussion section to further 
contextualize the Q-sorts, paying specific attention to the comments related to Q-statements 
that define factors, and to the responses of those Q-sorters whose positions strongly correlate 
with the associated factor (as indicated in Table 1). Where participantsÕ reflections are 
included, their written responses are labelled P#. 
 
5.! Analysis and interpretation of results 
Complete Q-sorts were analyzed using PQMethod software. A correlation matrix of all Q-
sorts was subject to factor analysis (in this case principal components analysis, PCA). A four-
factor solution was retained, explaining 62% of total variance. The four-factor solution was 
chosen as each factor was statistically significant with an Eigenvalue >1.00, with at least two 
Q-sorts loading on each factor (factors 5+ did not meet these two criteria). The four factors 
were then rotated using Varimax, which seeks to ensure that each Q-sort had a high factor 
loading to only one of the study factors, and that the factors are positioned in such a way that 
the final solution maximizes the amount of study variance explained. Participant loadings on 
factors are shown in Table 1. Participants (each individual Q-sort) are numbered 1-30. 
Loadings on factors are highlighted in bold to show defining sorts for that factor, i.e. the 
exemplars that reveal the shared item pattern or configuration that is characteristic of that 
factor (Watts and Stenner 2012). 
 
We interpret the factors as a series of summarizing accounts: each of which aims to explain 
the viewpoint being expressed by each factor and hence produce an ideal or aggregated 
perspective (which we refer to as a discourses). Each discourse is an interpretation of 
positions expressed within the Q-sorting process, constructed by careful reference to the 
positioning and overall configuration of the items in the relevant best-estimate factor arrays 
(Watts and Stenner 2012). In interpreting the discourses, we followed StevensonÕs (2015) and 
Cuppen et alÕs (2010) method: we examine statements that have the highest and lowest scores 
for each factor (statements ranked at +4 and -4 for each factor) to set the context of the 
discourse, combined with discussion of the distinguishing statements (i.e. statements that 
were ranked significantly differently between a given factor and all other factors, and the 
statements that were not ranked differently by any factors, see: Webler et al. 2009).  
 
Table 2 shows the list of statements and factor Q-sort values for each. In the narrative 
description statements numbers are indicated alongside the Q-sort value score in the 
composite factor array; e.g. (s10, -4*) indicated statement number 10 loaded at -4 (least like 
my perspective). The distinguishing statements for each factor marked ^ are significant at 
P<.05; statements marked 
* 
are significant at P<.01. 
 
Each factor is given a moniker or label to summarize the salient features of the account: 
 
Discourse 1: Top-down climate action (D1) 
Discourse 2: Collective action on climate change (D2) 
Discourse 3: Optimistic, values-focused adaptation (D3) 
Discourse 4: Adaptation skepticism (D4) 
 
Discourse 1 ÐTop-down climate action (D1) 
The context to this discourse is that climate change is deemed by proponents to be an urgent, 
deeply significant and personal issue that cannot be ignored (and that they would not want to 
ignore it) (s27, -4). Specific threats/negative climate change impacts such as extreme weather 
events (flood, drought, storms) are believed to be a significant risk (s22, +4); and the 
reporting of these threats from climate change in the media is not exaggerated or amplified 
(s12, -4), implying a true representation of the risks involved. In terms of the response to 
these threats, it is noteworthy that this account does not prioritize mitigation measures over 
adaptation (s33, -2*), as P10 qualifies:  
 
ÒI believe that this (mitigation prioritization) is true in a perfect world but we have 
possibly already passed a tipping point, therefore we have to plan to adapt just as 
much as we should to mitigate (in relation to S33).Ó 
 
This implies that proponents of this discourse advocate a holistic approach to the climate 
change issue, noting that adaptation is an essential component (s26, +3*) of climate change 
strategy. However, when it comes to extreme climate change impacts (defined as those that 
related to 4
o
C or greater warming scenarios) adaptation is construed as contributing to or 
detracting from the urgency of the issue overall (s10, -3*). 
 
With regards to the management responsibilities it is significant that although across all 
discourses there is support for multi-stakeholder collaboration across multiple scales of 
public and private sector and civil society interest., This viewpoint indicates a preference for 
Government-level responsibility in adaptation and mitigation planning decisions (s3, +2*) 
specifically as they relate to Government incentivisation to remove financial barriers to 
adaptation planning and encourage technological development strategies (s31, +2
^
).) as 
opposed to a focus upon the individual (s30, -2) and individual values (s16, 0*). As P26 
states: 
 
IÕm not sure how I prioritise my values. Certainly I think about my family first (in 
relation to statement 16) 
 
In summary, this discourse represents a perspective that is sure of the risks posed by 
anthropogenic climate change, and the urgency for personal and political action in relation to 
this perceived threat. However, this personal concern with the climate change issue (in its 
broadest sense), translates into a call for more urgent and decisive action on adaptation 
planning, policy and decision-making specifically at the international (s28, +3) and national 
scale (s3, +2) rather than upon individual responsibility for personal adaptation and the 
prioritisation of (pro-environmental/pro-adaptation-related) personal values, in part as it 
appears, because the idea of personal value prioritization did not resonate with proponents of 
this discourse. As P15 states:  
 
Climate change is too big for individuals, and collective global action is needed at the 
highest level (in relation to s3).  
 
This discourse could therefore be interpreted as a call for greater top-down intervention from 
government and transnational organizations in response to climate change, whilst also 
emphasizing the importance and urgency of adaptation within this.  
 
Discourse 2: Collective action on climate change (D2) 
Like discourse 1 (D1), discourse 2 (D2) is contextualized by an overarching concern for the 
immediacy and scale of long-term anthropogenic climate change impacts: such as the 
increased probability and intensity of extreme weather events, flood and drought (s22, +4); 
that adaptation is both an issue that is urgent in terms of international political cooperation 
and collaboration in policy making (s28, -2*), and one that may or may not be exaggerated 
by media reporting of the issue (s12, 0*). As P4 states: 
 
  If anything the issue has been under-exaggerated (sic) (in relation to s12).    
 
This urgency at the international level is mirrored in other scales of climate governance. 
There is key emphasis upon action as a collaborative effort across different sections of civil 
society including government and private sector interests (s34, +4), of which individual 
responsibility organized at the community level has a part to play (s30, +2*). As P15 states: 
 
ItÕs the Òone person jumps nothing happens, but if one hundred people jump itÕs 
enough to make a change in noise and vibrationÓ thing (in relation to s30). 
 
Also in common with D1 is a concern with Government playing a leading role in both 
adaptation-related decision-making (s3, +3) and in the removal of financial and technological 
barriers to adaptation (s31, +3), with a sense that it is these barriers that must be overcome in 
order for adaptation to be successful (s6, +1^). However, there is a marked difference in the 
perception of adaptation as a Government response to the climate change problem. D2 is 
distinguished as something of a pro-mitigation viewpoint disputing the necessity of 
adaptation as a component of broader climate change strategy (s26, -4), preferring that 
mitigation is prioritized over adaptation (s33, +2
^
). As P24 summarizes: 
 
Mitigation will be significantly cheaper and easier in the long run than adaptation (in 
relation to s26). 
 
However, it was strongly disputed that adaptation should remain the lowest priority on the 
government agenda (s2, -3). On the whole, climate change mitigation and adaptation are both 
viewed as having a role, despite a lean towards mitigation. This is partly explained by a 
pessimism over collective/societal capacity to adapt in the face of severe climatic variability 
under high emissions scenarios (s10, -4).  
 
To summarize, this discourse represents a position that is, as with D1, concerned with 
urgency and potential impact of climate change, yet is skeptical of encouraging action on 
adaptation. In part, this is explained by a position that adaptation is not possible in the face of 
high cost climate-related impacts such as extreme weather events, and so mitigation should 
be prioritized. Proponents of this perspective show a greater concern with multi-level 
governance at different scales of action Ð stressing urgency in international and national 
political action on climate change as a collective action problem, alongside responsibilities 
for stakeholders across public and private interests, and individual and community-level 
actions on mitigation. This suggests that proponents of this discourse favor action on 
mitigation prioritized over adaptation and that this in turn is linked to a preference for multi-
scalar collective action solutions.  
 
Discourse 3 ÐOptimistic values-focused adaptation (D3) 
Like D1 and D2, this perspective displays a similar emphasis upon the role of Government in 
prioritizing climate change Ð asserting that economic development and other welfare issues 
should not be prioritized over long-term climate change policy and planning (s2, -4*), whilst 
remaining relatively neutral on the prioritization of mitigation-versus-adaptation in the policy 
process (s9, 0^). There is only a slight expressed preference for mitigation (s33, +1^), in 
contrast to other discourses (D2 and D4). Proponents of this discourse do not perceive that 
involvement in adaptation planning presents an opportunity cost for society that would 
worsen the economy (s13, -3^).  
 
What differentiates this perspective is that the emphasis is clearly upon the individual and 
their role in adaptation responses as an expression of personal moral and socio-political 
values. Like D2, there is a (in this case very strong) support for focusing upon adaptation at 
the level of the individual acting within a community-level adaptation setting (s30, +4*). 
Specific to this discourse unlike any of the others is an optimism over civil society capacity 
to adapt is expressed in the context of individuals prioritizing personal climate adaptation 
values (s16, +3^), which themselves will have influence upon the strategies chosen in 
adaptation (s18, +4*). As P29 states: 
 
Individual values need to be about compassion and respect for others less fortunate 
than ourselves, if we had that then we would all act on climate change (in relation to 
s16). 
 
To summarize, this discourse represents an optimistic position on the adaptive capacity of the 
UK in the face of climate change impacts. Though it recognizes the importance of 
government action at nation and international levels, proponents of this discourse prioritize 
individual action, specifically of climate change related values, including individual 
responsibility and empathy for vulnerable people, and hence seek to overcome the potential 
political and financial barriers to adaptation that may emerge.  
 
Discourse 4 Ð Adaptation skepticism (D4) 
The context to this discourse is, like D1, D2 and D3, that climate change remains on the 
political agenda (s19, -4) and that on a personal level, proponents of this discourse wish to 
engage with the issue, rather than ignore it (s27, -4). There is a sense of being concerned with 
the risks that it presents to UK society. As seen in discourse 2, there is strong expression of a 
pro-mitigation preference (s33, +4*), as P6 states: 
 
Surely we canÕt keep adapting to change - there has to be a point where we canÕt 
adapt (in relation to s3). 
 
However, unlike the other discourses discourses, there is skepticism - that the effects of 
climate change have been exaggerated by media reporting on the issue (s12, +2*). This is 
potentially indicative of concern of media over-stretch: whereby media exaggeration of dread 
environmental risks prompts acts as a barrier to collective action on climate change (see for 
example Weingart et al. 2000).  
 
This discourse presents further skepticism of the relative value of adaptation in relation to 
both its perceived benefits and drawbacks. Proponents of this discourse assert that any 
adaptation measures put into place will have little impact upon our relative adaptive capacity 
to climate change (s14, +2*), or upon individual lifestyles and social practices (s15, -3*) in 
the face of such threats, linking with the reduced sense of non-governmental actorsÕ power 
demonstrated in this discourse (s3, -3). As P9 states: 
 
Mitigation of risks are a higher priority and will have a greater impact on climate 
change (in relation to s14). 
 
The position presented in this discourse stands in contrast to the IPCCÕs assertion that 
sustainable development, community vulnerability and climate change are linked; this 
discourse reveals expressed skepticism about the disproportionate impacts of climate change 
upon the worldÕs poorest people (s5, -2*), or that assessing the vulnerability of such 
communities is important in adapting to climate change (s17, -2*). It is notably the only 
discourse that takes this stance on those two statements. This can be interpreted as a climate-
change-affects-everyone stance, particularly in light of the strong assertion that climate 
change adaptation (and in the context of the other statements in this discourse, mitigation) 
must be a collaborative, multi-stakeholder effort (s34, +4).  
 
Discussion 
As in LoÕs (2016) study of climate change discourses in Hong Kong, we assert that Q-method 
allows us insight into the different groupings of stakeholder perspectives on climate 
adaptation and their socio-political underpinnings Ð in essence it reveals the ways in which 
heterogeneous public actors socially construct and demarcate the adaptation concept in 
discourse. Unlike a traditional social survey, we seek not to measure traits that are Ôout thereÕ 
in the world, but rather to determine segments of subjectivities that a person, or groups of 
people, have toward a particular context or phenomenon (Hutson et al. 2010). We make no 
claims about the relative prevalence of adaptation perspectives nor its 
geographic/demographic distribution; and as Martin (2008) asserts, there is no  fundamental 
reason to assume that representation in terms of demographic variables would translate into 
representation in terms of perspectives (see also Cuppen et al. 2010).  
 
Our use of principal components analysis of 30 Q-sorts and subsequent qualitative 
interpretation of the factors reveal the typologies of perspectives emergent in the debate. One 
feature of this analysis is to uncover the statements that do not distinguish between factors 
(Table 3) and those that do (Table 4). The former are indicative of discursive consensus and 
hence of adaptation strategies/policies/ideas that will likely encounter support (or at least 
little resistance) from citizen-stakeholder actors. The latter are indicative of disagreement 
amongst competing stakeholder perspectives and are therefore worthy of further research and 
constructive multi-stakeholder dialogue in the development of adaptation strategy.  
Certain Q-statements separate certain discourse from others. Notable in this regard is s3. We 
note that Top-down Climate Action D1 and Collective Action on Mitigation D2 indicate a 
preference for government-led action with regards to climate change strategies. In the UK 
context, adaptation has been reframed in recent years as Ôweather resilienceÕ, Ôcommunity 
protectionÕ or Ôlivelihood protectionÕ. This raises some concerns amongst academic and 
climate advocacy actors about the ability and appetite of UK local governments to address 
climate adaptation directly (Porter et al. 2015). In this context, we postulate that there are 
different preferences around adaptation responsibilities, specifically. Notably the division is 
between proponents of top-down intervention on adaptation (proponents of D1 and D2), 
versus those that favor individual responsibility as a reflection of personal values (D3) and 
those that are simply more skeptical about adaptation as a moral hazard in relation to 
mitigation (D4).  
 
The differentiation in the framing of adaptation responsibility is pertinent to ongoing debates 
surrounding common but differentiated responsibility in climate governance. The concept 
was initially applied to state interactions internationally in negotiating heterogeneous 
domestic GHG reduction commitments based upon differential development status and 
relative capacity to act (Rajamani 2000). Climate change responsibilities are commonly 
framed as: those that cause the problem are morally responsible for solving it, i.e. the Polluter 
Pays Principle. Yet descriptions of common but differentiated responsibility in international 
and domestic law do not provide a complete account of who should bear the burdens of 
global climate change (Caney 2005). Scholarship on adaptation responsibilities has 
commonly focused upon defining responsibility for impacts, fair burden sharing, and the 
distribution of  adaptation assistance either to vulnerable countries (Paavola and Adger 2006), 
or to specific social groups (including, for example, tribes Whyte 2013). Yet this literature is 
less clear about the differentiation of responsibilities for adaptation measures at multiple 
scales and policy/legal domains. The most commonly cited solution is to build common 
responsibility amongst different stakeholder groups by binding them through collective 
action (Adger 2003), and/or through active involvement in multi-stakeholder adaptation 
planning measures (Storbjrk 2007). It is notable in our findings, therefore, that the inclusion 
of multiple stakeholders in adaptation planning was agreed to be important from all 
perspectives (s34). However, the key differences between these discourses are held in regard 
to the responsibility and adaptive capacity of individuals. The importance of the individualÕs 
role at the foundation of successful adaptation strategies was demonstrated within D2 and D3 
(s30). Optimism about the perceived capabilities of the individual in D3 and the role of 
collective action is also evidenced D2. Optimistic Values-Focused Adaptation D3 is the only 
discourse that supports the idea of an individual responsibility to rethink personal values to 
align with adaptation priorities (s16), suggesting onus upon the individual, rather than the 
state, to act on adaptation. It is only D4, The Adaptation Skepticism view suggests that 
individuals should be less concerned with their own values (s16) nor should adaptive actions 
seek to begin at the individual or community level (s30) as there the individual level holds no 
power to address climate change.  
 
Given the discursive differences in the perceived role for top-down governmental and inter-
governmental authorities versus the individual, there is a potential conflict that may emerge, 
which we argue represents a responsibility gap if both institutional authorities and individual 
citizens effectively ÔoffloadÕ their responsibilities to the other party, so to speak. As there is 
no consensus on the level and types of responsibilities that different actors at different scales 
hold, greater clarity is needed within policy about which stakeholders (from public 
institutions to citizen-stakeholders) have which responsibilities at specific geographic, 
institutional and temporal scales, particularly given the overall preference for a collaborative, 
multi-stakeholder approach to the issue (s34). We see a key area of climate adaptation 
discourse and further action for both environmental policy research and climate policy-
authorities, to examine the differentiated sense of responsibility between citizen-stakeholders 
and public authorities, and within that a differentiated role for values in addressing the social 
limits to adaptation (see for example Adger et al. 2009). 
 
As noted above, the solution to a responsibility gap in adaptation is likely a collaborative 
one, taking place across multiple levels from government to the individual, given the 
consensus across discourses on this type of approach. D3 showed the weakest agreement with 
a collaborative multi-stakeholder approach, though it is more broadly Ôbottom-upÕ and 
citizen-led in its outlook towards adaptation, which is congruent with a collaborative model 
of citizen engagement and collective action. When combined with the agreement amongst the 
other three discourses for Ôtop downÕ public authority-led climate change (adaptation) 
responsibility, this reinforces the status of adaptation based on incremental and participatory 
actions rather than more centrally-controlled transformative approaches (see for example 
Wise et al. 2014), in the sense that a multi-stakeholder, collective focus on adaptive 
responsibility posits climate adaptation as a societal risk: requiring collective, community and 
place-based, rather than individual, action.   
 
Of further concern is that the dichotomy of mitigation-adaptation is repeated in our findings 
here. D1 for example expressed that climate change mitigation should not be prioritized over 
adaptation (s33) in contrast to the other three discourses. A preference for mitigation amongst 
D2, D3, and D4 is potentially grounded in a principled argument for responsibility to reduce 
climate change risks, rather than minimize their effects. This is most clearly shown in D2 
(s26). Yet preference within the mitigation-adaptation dichotomy is in part related to the 
relative optimism shown towards the success of adaptation strategies, specifically D1 & D3 
strongly oppose the idea that successful adaptation is merely a theoretical notion (s14) and 
even Adaptation Scepticism D4 articulated that there is some role for adaptation within the 
climate change policy response (though less than D1 and D3).  
 
The areas of contention within the viewpoints do not define the climate change adaptation 
discourse alone, i.e. those statements that were not distinguished by any one factor. These 
statements are indicative of agreement on the value attributed to them across the four 
viewpoints and can be (tentatively) described as consensus viewpoints. Despite differences of 
opinion over the causes and consequences of climate change across the discourses, all 
demonstrated a preference to remain aware of climate change risks rather than to ignore them 
(s27) with D1 and D4 demonstrating this most strongly. This ÔawarenessÕ centered upon the 
risks of climate change, specifically extreme weather events (s22) which had strong 
agreement across the discourses, and that a collaborative multi-stakeholder approach is 
needed (s34). This is tentatively indicative of a strong pro-climate change action-position as 
consensual across the accounts, in the sense that there is no strong skepticism about the 
scientific basis of anthropogenic climate change expressed in the accounts here. There was 
also agreement that adaptation alone may not be sufficient to cope with climate change (s1), 
and that traditional ÔhardÕ engineered strategies should not be the only type of climate 
adaptation response taken (s8). Collectively we can interpret this consensus representing a 
collective concern for long-term climate risks, that this is imagined as a socio-technical 
problem (rather than solely technical problem), one that requires a collaborative solution, and 
that this solution must involve adaptation and mitigation components (to varying degrees 
across the competing perspectives). There was agreement that prioritizing adaptation within 
policy would be unlikely to worsen any other issues that the United Kingdom was facing 
(s13), in essence that it was not perceived as an additional undue financial burden to society. 
This is potentially explained by a belief that planning for adaptation to climate change is not 
a novel phenomenon (s23) or one that has dropped off the agenda (S19). This has 
significance because previous studies of climate change perceptions reveal climate change to 
be perceived as a remote, future problem (see for example Wolf and Moser 2011), and yet the 
incidence of extreme weather events and the perceptual relationship to adaptation makes this 
appear as a more immediate problem.  
 
We can infer that there is general support for measures to combat extreme weather-related 
impacts, but that these are generally perceived as contemporary issues for policy and public 
expenditure rather than abstract future problems (potentially evidenced by peopleÕs exposure 
to images of recent high profile flooding-related events, see Capstick et al. 2015). In short, 
our data can be interpreted as showing that adaptation planning is perceived as compatible 
with meeting the needs of current citizens (an intra-generational) rather than a future (inter-
generational) climate change problem, though the prevalence of this discursive framing 





This study has demonstrated the boundary work of the adaptation concept - exploring the 
range of viewpoints across citizen-stakeholdersÕ multiple interpretations and relationships 
between these interpretations. This is because Q-method has the capacity to explore the 
contextual discursive attempts to reconcile competing understandings and definitions of the 
problem of climate change adaptation (see for example Shackley and Wynne 1996). The 
issue of boundary work in climate change research has predominantly focused upon 
boundaries between policy and expert worlds Ð through the attempts by such actors to define 
practices around climate science-to environmental policy in contrast to one another through 
demarcation, and other attempts to find productive cooperation across boundaries (in contrast 
to a model of science policy interactions that essentialises climate science as something that 
can be ÔtransferredÕ to policy, planning and public opinion) (Hoppe 2010). Yet given that 
adaptation is understood as a Ôbottom-upÕ, place-based and public-engagement focused 
practice (Rayner 2010; Schreurs 2008), it is important to understand the ways in which public 
actors engage in boundary work Ð how they discursively demarcate the adaptation concept 
and its proposed solutions. Our research shows that across heterogeneous stakeholder 
perspectives (including those of lay public actors) there are key areas of agreement on the 
value of adaptation within broader climate policy, of a multi-stakeholder and ÔsoftÕ social 
adaptation process, that complements, but does not replace climate mitigation at the core of 
environmental policy. However, although climate change is consensually posited as an issue 
which participants collectively wanted to Ôkeep on the agendaÕ (a finding likely welcomed by 
advocates of climate change action), it remains the only admission of responsibility 
demonstrated across all four viewpoints. The discourses were split on whether this issue of 
adaptation was the responsibility of government to address, or whether it required a more 
holistic approach to achieve the most successful outcome. We can conclude, therefore, that 
this responsibility gap within adaptation discourse between citizen-stakeholders and public 
authorities, is an issue requiring urgent research and response from UK policy-makers and 
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Table 1. Participant loadings on factors 
Q-sort 
no. 
Sorter details Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
1.!  Consultancy, F, 30-39 0.6901    0.2278     0.4433     0.2324 
2.!  No profession, F, 18-29 0.3847 0.3737    -0.0449     0.5246 
3.!  Research, F, 30-39 0.3651 0.5802    0.2909     0.1594 
4.!  Civil service, F, 40-49 0.6856 0.3746     0.2685    -0.0392 
5.!  Farming, M, 50-59 0.6054 -0.0687     0.3629     0.3196 
6.!  Transport planning, F, 18-29 0.2136 -0.2179 0.1054 0.7210 
7.!  Public sector, M, 40-49 0.8323 0.0200 -0.2204     0.0326 
8.!  Urban planning, M, 18-29 0.7087   -0.0065     0.2745     0.2278 
9.!  Logistics, M, 18-29 -0.0347 0.4462    -0.1897     0.6846 
10.!  Technical support, M, 18-29 0.2466     0.2530     0.4630    0.0184 
11.!  Sales, M, 18-29 0.2444     0.4343     0.0882     0.6261 
12.!  Retired, M, 60+ 0.2764 0.6875   -0.0047     0.0721 
13.!   Consulting, F, 18-29 0.1954     0.4536     0.5104     0.3646 
14.!  Retired, M, 60+ 0.5063     0.1433     0.4134     0.3513 
15.!  Public sector, F, 18-29 0.0874     0.8538    0.1403     0.1468 
16.!  Environment sector, M, 30-40 0.4917     0.4429     0.2912     0.3398 
17.!  Property surveying, M, 18-29 0.6062    0.2402     0.0873     0.2166 
18.!  (No data) F, (no data) 0.5059 0.3452     0.1094     0.1680 
19.!  Public sector, F, 50-60 0.1618     0.1235     0.6151    0.2151 
20.!  Retired, M, 60+ 0.6840    0.2970     0.3332     0.1357 
21.!  In higher education, F, 18-30 0.7210 0.1354    -0.1045     0.0097 
22.!   (No data) F, (no data) -0.0443 -0.0110     0.3481     0.5638 
23.!  Health service, M, 50-60 0.1058 -0.0795    -0.6477    0.0507 
24.!  Engineer, M, 50-60 0.1376     0.9047    0.2144     0.0458 
25.!  Civil Service, M, 30-40 -0.2025 -0.3940     0.1747    -0.7966 
26.!  Retired, M, 60+ -0.1211 0.1517    0.7580    0.0791 
27.!  Teaching, F, 30-40 0.6784    0.2952     0.2563     0.3457 
28.!  SME manager, M, 40-50 0.3763     0.2417     0.5731 -0.0452 
29.!  Public health, F, 30-40 0.2798     0.4953   -0.0511     0.3037 
30.!  Teaching, F, 60+ 0.7475 0.4855     0.1919    -0.1478 
 
N.B. Numbers in bold represent a defining sort for that factor 
 
  
Table 2 Q-sort statements and factor arrays 
 Factor 
Statement 1 2 3 4 
1 In the long term, adaptation strategies alone may not be sufficient to cope 
with all the projected impacts of climate change. 
+2 +3 +2 +3 
2 There are always other costs that the government should prioritise over 
adapting to climate change e.g. the economy, welfare concerns. 
 -1* -3* -4^ 0* 
3 The only power to make real decisions about climate change adaptation is 
achieved through policy at a national government level. 
+2* +3* -2 -3 
4 Engagement with the public on potential climate change adaptation is the 
responsibility of local agencies (e.g. local gov. and local 
industries/businesses) to engage with the public. 
-2 -1* 0 0 
5 Climate change adaptation strategies will disproportionately affect the 
worldÕs poorest people. 
+1 0 +2 -1* 
6 When barriers, such as technological requirements and financial 
limitations, are overcome then society will be able to successfully adapt to 
a changing climate. 
-1 +1* -1 -2 
7 I am concerned about the melting of the polar ice caps. 
 
+2 +1 +3 0 
8 Adaptation to climate change should be focused on traditional, hard 
techniques such as structural adjustments e.g. sea walls to combat rising 
sea levels. 
-2 -3 -2 -2 
9 Adaptation strategies and mitigation strategies must complement one 
another. 
 
+3 +2 0^ +3 
10 An average global temperature increase of four degrees by the end of the 
century is something that humanity can adapt to. 
-3* -4* +1^ 0^ 
11 ÔClimate change adaptationÕ is a loosely defined term. 
 
0 -1 -1 +1 
12 I think that the potential effects of climate change have been exaggerated 
by the media and other outlets. 
-4 0^ -4 +2^ 
13 Other problems that society is currently facing could be worsened if 
government policy prioritises climate change adaptation e.g. economic 
recovery may be hindered. 
-1 -1 -3* -1 
14 Adapting to the effects of change is a good idea in theory but it will never 
have a real world impact on climate as an issue. 
-3 0 -3 +2^ 
15 The implementation of climate change adaptation strategies will alter my 
lifestyle significantly. 
0 -1 0 -3^ 
16 As humans continue to develop, individuals and groups need to prioritise 
their own values to meet the requirements for adapting to climate change. 
0* -2 +3^ -3 
17 A successful strategy of adaptation is only achievable when there is full 
understanding of who is or could become vulnerable. 
0 +1 0 -2^ 
18 The values of individuals will have a significant influence on the success 
of potential climate change adaptation strategies.  
+1 0 +4^ +1 
19 Climate change has dropped off the agenda -3 -3 -1^ -4* 
20 Strategies to adapt to climate change will be most effective in the local, 
community setting. 
-1 +2 +3 -1 
21 I am unsure what strategies fall under the term of Ôclimate change 
adaptationÕ.  
0 0 -2 -1 
22 As climate changes, the probability of extreme weather events will 
increase (e.g. extreme flooding, droughts and storms). 
+4 +4 +2 +2 
23 Planning for adaptation to climate change is not a new thing. +1 +1 0 0 
24 In order for climate change adaptation strategies to be wholly worthwhile 
they must actively seek to achieve additional benefits as well as adapting 
to climate change (e.g. job creation). 
+1 -1 -3 +1 
25 Adapting to climate change will be detrimental to economic growth and 
opportunity. 
-1 -2 -2 0 
26 Successful adaptation is an absolute necessity in addressing the problem 
of climate change. 
+3^ -4^ +1 +1 
27 I would prefer to ignore climate change as an issue. -4 -2 -1 -4 
28 There is a lack of urgency at an international level with regards to 
addressing climate change as an issue. 
+3 -2^ +1^ +3 
29 The United Kingdom has the capabilities to adapt to the effects of climate 
change. 
0 0 +2 +1 
30 Any successful attempts to address climate change must begin with 
individuals (at a community level). 
-2 +2^ +4^ -2 
31 It is the role of the government to remove any barriers to climate change 
adaptation strategies (such as financial limits and technological 
requirements). 
+2* +3* -1 -1 
32 We need to clearly prioritise the type of adaptation strategies that are 
being implemented e.g. flood management vs. heat stress. 
+1 +1 0 +2 
33 The focus should always remain on climate change mitigation strategies 
rather than adaptation strategies. 
-2^ +2* +1* +4^ 
34 Climate change adaptation must be a collaborative effort and must involve 
a range of stakeholders (e.g. general public, business sector, local 
government, national government). 
+4 +4 +1^ +4 
 
  
Table 3 Statements that do not distinguish between factors 
 Factor 
Statement 1 2 3 4 
34. Climate change adaptation must be a collaborative effort and must involve a range 
of stakeholders (e.g. general public, business sector, local government, national 
government). 
+4 +4 +1 +4 
22. As climate changes, the probability of extreme weather events will increase (e.g. 
extreme flooding, droughts and storms). 
+4 +4 +2 +2 
1. In the long term, adaptation strategies alone may not be sufficient to cope with all the 
projected impacts of climate change. 
+2 +3 +2 +3 
23. Planning for adaptation to climate change is not a new thing. +1 +1 0 0 
19. Climate change has dropped off the agenda -3 -3 -1 -4 
27. I would prefer to ignore climate change as an issue. -4 -2 -1 -4 
8. Adaptation to climate change should be focused on traditional, hard techniques such 
as structural adjustments e.g. sea walls to combat rising sea levels. 
-2 -3 -2 -2 
13. Other problems that society is currently facing could be worsened if government 
policy prioritises climate change adaptation e.g. economic recovery may be hindered. 
-1 -1 -3 -1 
N.B. All statements non-significant at >P=.05 
  
Table 4 Statements that distinguish between factors 
 Factor 
Statement 1 2 3 4 
3. The only power to make real decisions about climate change adaptation 
is achieved through policy at a national government level. 
+2 +3 -2 -3 
14. Adapting to the effects of change is a good idea in theory but it will 
never have a real-world impact on climate change as an issue. 
-3 0 -3 +2 
16. As humans continue to develop, individuals and groups need to 
prioritise their own values to meet the requirements for adapting to 
climate change. 
0 -2 +3 -3 
26. Successful adaptation is an absolute necessity in addressing the 
problem of climate change. 
+3 -4 +1 +1 
30. Any successful attempts to address climate change must begin with 
individuals (at a community level). 
-2 +2 +4 -2 
33. The focus should always remain on climate change mitigation 
strategies rather than adaptation strategies. 
-2 +2 +1 +4 
 27 
 
 
 
